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Chapter 5  The Militant Diagram and the Problem of Political 
Passion 
Nicholas Thoburn 
 
Abstract 
This paper is a critique of the political figure of the militant. It argues that the 
militant is an unproductive mode of subjectivity for communist politics. In 
particular the paper seeks to understand the ways militancy effectuates 
processes of political passion and a certain unworking or deterritorialisation of 
the self in relation to political organisations and the wider social environment 
within which militants would enact change. To this end the paper traces a 
‘diagram’ or ‘abstract machine’ of militancy, a diagram drawn from Guattari’s 
analysis of Leninism and the model of struggle set out by the Russian nihilist 
Sergei Nechaev. Foregrounding specific techniques and affective and semiotic 
registers, the paper explores a particular animation of abstract militant 
functions in the Weatherman organisation in the United States at the turn of 
the 1970s. It then sketches the principle outlines of a counter figure – an 
‘a-militant diagram’, or dispersive ecology of political composition – that 
draws together Marx’s figure of the party, Jacques Camatte’s critique of the 
political ‘racket’, and Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to the problem of the 
group and its outside.106 
 
 
‘Mutant’ workers in ‘veritable wars of subjectivity’; for Félix Guattari (1996: 124), this is 
what constitutes the history of the workers’ movement. He has in mind the events of 
revolutionary upheaval, the Paris Commune, October 1917, May 1968. But the problematic of 
revolutionary subjectivity – in its affective, semiotic, organisational, and imaginary registers – is 
one that pervades modern socialist, communist and anarchist politics. This problematic is that 
of the ‘militant’, of ‘militancy’, a persistent marker – indeed, often the self-declared guarantor – 
of radical subjectivity across the spectrum of extra-parliamentary politics. One can think of 
militancy as a technology of the self, an expression of the working on the self in the service of 
revolutionary change. However, unlike the subjective correlates of the great revolutionary events, 
for Guattari this more prosaic aspect of radical practice is not altogether joyful. 
This paper is a critique of the militant. In particular it seeks to understand the ways 
militancy effectuates political passions and a certain unworking or deterritorialisation of the self 
in relation to political organisations and the wider social environment within which militants 
would enact change. To this end the paper traces a ‘diagram’ or ‘abstract machine’ of militancy 
and considers a particular animation of this diagram in the Weatherman organisation in the 
United States at the turn of the 1970s. Returning to Marx’s figure of the party, the paper then 
sketches the principle outlines of an ‘a-militant diagram’, or dispersive ecology of political 
composition, that suggests a rather different process of subjective unworking. 
 
Militant Passion 
Guattari (1984: 184-95) locates the emergence of the modern militant formation in what 
he calls the ‘Leninist breakthrough’ during the 1903 Second Congress of the All-Russian Social 
Democratic Labour Party, from where – following certain procedural and organisational 
disputes – emerged a set of affective, semiotic, imaginary, tactical, and organisational traits that 
constitute a kind of Leninist diagram or abstract machine. For Deleuze and Guattari, the 
                                                             
106 Copyright on images 
None of the images used here need copyright permission as far as I know, except for Figure 3 (Kathleen Cleaver/Black 
Panther Party). If Figure 3 is included in the published version then either I or the publisher should probably pay $25 
to Berkeley: http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/reference/dsu/forms/agreement.pdf 
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diagram or abstract machine is that which governs the articulation and distribution of matter 
and function in concrete assemblages (where a concrete assemblage may be a carcereal 
institution, an aesthetic school, a military technology, a mode of architectural practice, and so 
on). The diagram is not an ideal type, infrastructure or transcendent idea but a non-unifying 
immanent cause that is coextensive with the concrete assemblages that express it. These 
assemblages, in their divergent manifestations and unexpected conjunctions, in turn feedback 
into the diagram, both consolidating and modifying its abstract imperatives. As such, even as 
one sees a regularity of function across its iterations, the diagram is in principle a force of 
undetermined change, and one existent in a state of disequilibrium. 
As a tool of analysis, the concept of the diagram enables one to attend to continuities or 
‘resonances’ across superficially divergent phenomena and to approach an understanding of the 
dynamic consistency of arrangements of heterogeneous materials (bodies, signs, images, 
technologies, affects…), whilst requiring attention be paid to both abstract functions and 
concrete manifestations as they exist in mutual presupposition. Insofar as the diagram is an 
abstract entity that is only perceivable through diverse concrete manifestations, the mapping of 
any diagram is an inexact, tentative, and experimental procedure. It is something like a ‘working 
hypothesis that must be examined with care, re-worked, perhaps even ousted altogether’ 
(Guattari 1984: 190), and is useful only insofar as it brings an appreciation of consistencies, 
creative processes, points of tension, knots of power, lines of escape that aid intervention in its 
field. Of course, any concrete assemblage – including a political grouping – will be governed by 
more than one diagram.107 
As to the militant diagram (born in 1903 and consolidated in ‘effects of repetition’ largely 
secured by the significance of Bolshevism to the 1917 revolution) Guattari argues that it is 
characterized by: the production of a field of inertia that restricts openness and encourages 
uncritical acceptance of slogans and doctrine; the hardening of situated statements into 
universal dogma; the attribution of a messianic vocation to the party; and a domineering and 
contemptuous attitude – ‘that hateful “love” of the militant’– to those known as ‘the masses’ 
(Guattari 1984: 190). As any diagram, that of the militant draws together its substance in 
varying ways over time and place, but there is a noticeable regularity of functions upon which, as 
Guattari (1984: 189, 190) wrote in the 1970s, ‘our thinking is still largely dependent today’: 
‘From this fundamental breach, then, the Leninist machine was launched on its career; history 
was still to give it a face and a substance, but its fundamental encoding, so to say, was already 
determined’. In discussing the post-’68 French groupuscule milieu, Guattari (1995: 59) thus 
contends that the range of groups from anarchist to Maoist may at once be ‘radically opposed in 
their style: the definition of the leader, of propaganda, a conception of discipline, loyalty, 
modesty, and the asceticism of the militant’, but they essentially perform the same militant 
function of ‘stacking’, ‘sifting’, and ‘crushing’ desiring energies. 
Guattari’s essay is especially attentive to the breach in the normal course of things 
enacted by the Bolsheviks between February and October 1917. But when it comes to Guattari’s 
wider presentation there is a trait of the militant diagram that lacks full articulation, that of 
passional struggle and its mode of subjective composition. This can be characterised in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s terms as the constitutive ‘line of flight’ of militancy. Here we need to complicate 
Guattari’s analysis, which chimes with what Deleuze and Guattari (1988: Ch 5) will later call the 
‘signifying regime of signs’, with an appreciation of the place within militant formations of the 
‘passional’ and ‘subjective’ ‘postsignifying regime of signs’. In the passional regime, one of a 
number of semiotic regimes that may be found in any concrete assemblage, the line of flight – 
the creative or exploratory aspect of an assemblage – takes a singular and dangerous value, 
operating as the vector upon which subjectivity is at once deterritorialised and intensified. 
Passional regimes are characterised by ‘points of subjectification’ that are constituted through 
                                                             
107 For a full elaboration of the concept of the diagram as it is used here, see Deleuze (1988: 23-44). 
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the ‘betrayal’ of dominant social relations and semiotic codes – Deleuze and Guattari offer the 
example of food for the anorexic – and a certain ‘monomania’ that, like a ‘black hole’ of 
destruction, draws the assemblage through a series of finite linear proceedings, each overcoded 
by the pursuit of its end, an existence ‘under reprieve’. The particular semiotic of the passional 
regime is composed of a subject of enunciation – a product of the mental reality determined by 
the point of subjectification – and a subject of the statement, where the latter is bound to the 
utterances of the former and acts – though the two poles can and do switch places and may be 
embodied in the same subject – in a ‘reductive echolalia’ as its respondent or guarantor. 
To isolate this passional aspect of militancy requires a turn to an earlier period of 
Russian agitation and Sergei Nechaev’s 1869 Catechism of the Revolutionist. In the 48 
principles that comprise the Catechism, Nechaev outlines an image of revolutionary action, 
operating through the closed cell of the political organisation, as a singular, all-encompassing 
passion. It is a cold, calculated passion that, beyond ‘romanticism’, ‘rapture’ or ‘hatred’, requires 
a dismantling of all relations to self and society that could be conceived of in any manner other 
than its own furtherance, even at the cost of death: 
 
The revolutionary is a dedicated man. He has no interests of his own, no affairs, no 
feelings, no attachments, no belongings, not even a name. Everything in him is absorbed 
by a single exclusive interest, a single thought, a single passion – the revolution. … All 
the tender and effeminate emotions of kinship, friendship, love, gratitude and even 
honour must be stifled in him by a cold and single-minded passion for the revolutionary 
cause. … Night and day he must have but one thought, one aim – merciless destruction. 
In cold-blooded and tireless pursuit of this aim, he must be prepared both to die himself 
and destroy with his own hands everything that stands in the way of its achievement. … 
If he is able to, he must face the annihilation of a situation, of a relationship or of any 
person who is part of this world – everything and everyone must be equally odious to 
him. (Nechaev 1989: 4-7)  
 
Given the exemplary misanthropy of Nechaev’s text one might be surprised to find that it 
has had a persistent presence in radical cultures: Lenin expressed admiration for the tenets of 
the Catechism; it was until relatively recently accepted as part of the cannon of revolutionary 
anarchism as a work once thought to have been co-authored with Bakunin; and it was popular 
amongst, and published and distributed by, the Black Panther Party (Blissett and Home n.d.; 
Hilliard and Cole 1993). These direct appreciations of the text betray a sense in which its model 
of passional struggle articulates, albeit in exaggerated form, an enduring property of the militant 
diagram. Its presence today, inflected through singular socio-historical conditions and amidst 
competing dynamics, is perhaps most apparent in jihadi approaches to struggle (Straus 2006), 
but it can also be detected in left activist cultures (Sullivan 2005), and may even have some 
purchase on the popular imaginary – it would, for instance, seem to account for much of the 
seductive quality of the militant subjectivity constructed in the 2006 Hollywood film V for 
Vendetta. 
 
Weatherman 
In order to examine the tangle of militant matters and functions further it is Instructive 
to consider the animation of the militant diagram in a particular political group, or concrete 
assemblage. The Weatherman organisation is a useful case because of the special emphasis the 
group placed on the militant transformation of subjectivity and the way the diagram of militancy 
here mobilises and draws a consistency from diverse social fields and problematics, notably 
countercultural styles of living, Maoist approaches to collectivity and struggle, anti-racism, drug 
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use, open sexuality, and guerrilla ideology.108 That Weatherman is currently the subject of some 
interest – with the publication since 2000 of a number of critical histories, a collection of 
communiqués and documents, the memoirs of two key figures, a novel, and an Academy 
Award-nominated feature documentary – also recommends it, especially since, as Jesse 
Lemisch (2006) notes, there are tendencies in the appreciation of the organisation that would 
fashion it within a critically unproductive, linear or generational narrative of a generic leftist 
resistance. Rather than offering an icon of revolutionary struggle, Weatherman is more useful 
for the possibility it allows for an exploration of the sometimes highly troubling dynamics and 
affects that can pass for manifestations of communist subjectivity. As an aside, it is worth noting 
that contemporary interest in the 1970s leftist urban guerrilla is not confined to the US. Japan’s 
own experience has been brought into contemporary focus and debate by Wakamatsu Koji’s 
highly acclaimed 2007 film, United Red Army, on the group of that name and its tragic 
articulation of militant subjectivity (Lee 2008). 
A core trait of the militant machine is the relation between inclusion in the group and 
commitment to that which characterises the group’s uniqueness. In both Guattari’s account of 
the ‘field of inertia’ of Bolshevism and Nechaev’s Catechism, the revolutionary organisation 
functions as a cut with the social and as a means to consolidate and intensify its mode of activity, 
an activity that in turn secures the individual’s subjective investment in, and formation through, 
the organisation. In the case of Weatherman, the mode of activity and the originality of the 
group was constituted through a particular conception of militant struggle. Framed as 
anti-imperialist action against the war in Vietnam and the repression of the black community in 
the US, militancy was characterised by two integrated aspects: the attempt to ‘Bring the war 
home!’ under the logic of opening up ‘two, three, many Vietnams’ in the fabric of US 
imperialism; and self-sacrifice or betrayal of the white-skin, bourgeois privilege that imperialism 
conferred on North American whites (including to a large extent the white working class). 
Militancy thus exhorted a flight away from bourgeois subjectivity toward a becoming with the 
Vietnamese and US blacks. Yet this was a strange becoming, one not constituted through the 
careful drawing of situated relations and projects but through the mimicry of a particular 
military practice (in what was clearly a very different context to the war situation of Vietnam) 
and the resultant experience of repression. In discussing Weatherman’s ‘Days of Rage’, Shin’ya 
Ono (1970: 241) expresses something of the kernel of this approach: ‘We began to feel the 
Vietnamese in ourselves. Some of us, at moments, felt we were ready to die’.109 
Framed in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, this militant sacrifice of the bourgeois self was 
Weatherman’s passional point of subjectification and offered the vector of its line of flight: ‘If 
you believed something, the proof of that belief was to act on it. It wasn’t to espouse it with the 
right treatises or manifestos. We were militants. … Militancy was the standard by which we 
measured our aliveness’ (Bill Ayers, cited in Varon 2004: 87). This vector was characterised by 
the impossible limit of truly becoming Americong, of experiencing the full weight of the 
repression of the US black working class, of fully escaping white subjectivity through 
militarisation. Militancy thus posed not only a moral standard against which revolutionary 
vitality and commitment would be assessed, but a kind of ‘quasi-spiritual test’ (as one 
pro-situationist critique of Weatherman put it), a test premised on the purification of 
                                                             
108 Weatherman emerged from the 1969 position paper ‘You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way 
the Wind Blows’ (a title famously taken from Bob Dylan’s ‘Subterranean Homesick Blues’) as the most militant wing 
of the US anti-Vietnam war movement, initially as a faction within the mass organisation Students for a Democratic 
Society but soon as an independent and then underground group, when it came to be known as the Weatherman 
Underground and, later, the gender-neutral Weather Underground Organisation, effectively disbanding in 1976. This 
paper is focused on the brief, pre-underground period of Weatherman.  
109 Weatherman’s ‘Days of Rage’ action in Chicago in October 1969 aimed at direct physical confrontation 
with the police and the destruction of property in order to encourage the subjective ‘breakthrough’ necessary for the 
establishment of a white revolutionary force. 
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subjectivity that could only be found through an ever-renewed and -intensified struggle whose 
limit was constituted ultimately by a preparedness for death (Point-Blank! 1972: 36).110 Such 
was the force of this vector of militancy that it could be affirmed by Weatherman – in a striking 
resemblance to Nechaev’s image of revolutionary passion and exemplifying Deleuze and 
Guattari’s understanding of the characteristic delusion of the passional regime – as a 
monomania.111 As Mark Rudd declared at the 1969 Flint ‘War Council’, the last and somewhat 
frenzied public gathering of Weatherman before its move underground: ‘I’m monomaniacal like 
Captain Ahab in Moby Dick. He was possessed by one thought: destroying the great white whale. 
We should be like Captain Ahab and possess one thought – destruction of the mother country’ 
(cited in Jacobs 1997: 85). 
What becomes clear in this articulation is that the efficacy of struggle, the possibility of 
situated and effective intervention in the social field, is subordinated to, or equated with, the 
construction of militant subjectivity.112 Through a betrayal or sacrifice of the bourgeois self, 
Weatherman came to constitute precisely the self (bolstered through the group subject of the 
organisation) on its passional line of flight as the locus and guarantor of political truth. This 
truth was manifest through a set of techniques by which the passion of struggle was played out 
across the body of the militant. 
Most pronounced was the activity, transposed from Chinese Maoism, of collective 
‘criticism/self-criticism’. In criticism sessions that might last for hours or days, Weather 
collectives would challenge and confess weaknesses in individual commitments to struggle, 
tactical mistakes, emotional investments, preparedness for violence, racist inclinations, sexual 
orientations, aesthetic preferences and so on. Blunt though it could be, criticism was a 
technology of collective access to, and modulation of, the psychic, cognitive, and affective 
territories and refrains of the self; put another way, it generated an open field of points of 
passional betrayal. Sessions may be directed at a particular problem for the group but would 
tend to focus on an individual member, each of whom – important for the weaving of a passional 
bond – would at different times experience the subject positions of accuser and confessor. 
Whilst for the Chinese Communist Party, at least in the period before the Cultural Revolution, 
criticism or ‘inner-Party struggle’ was primarily a formal procedure for externalising offending 
acts and developing a redemptive integration of individuals with the organisation (Dittmer 
1973), in Weatherman criticism took subjectivity directly as its object. The core purpose, as 
Susan Stern makes clear in her autobiographical account of the Seattle Weather collective, was 
to break-down and remake the self: 
 
The key to the hours of criticism was struggle. … To purge ourselves of the taint of some 
twenty-odd years of American indoctrination, we had to tear ourselves apart mentally. … 
With an enthusiasm born of total commitment we began the impossible task of 
                                                             
110 Weatherman’s integration of purity, struggle and sacrifice is especially apparent (and critically attended 
to) in Cathy Wilkerson’s (2007: 293) autobiography, where she writes: ‘The purity of total dedication scraped away 
many of the complexities of life and promised ultimate gratification. Besides, the competitive part of me wanted to be 
on the best team, the most passionate, the most sacrificing, the most uncompromising, and the most willing to follow 
each position to the extreme’. 
111 The relation of Weatherman’s actions to the overwhelming feeling of powerlessness induced by the horror 
of the war in Indochina and the brutalisation of black North Americans (most publicly the police assassination of the 
Black Panther Party’s Fred Hampton and Mark Clark) exemplifies Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988: 121) point that active 
monomania might loosely correspond with (and, hence, be a particular political problem for) peasant and working 
class formations – ‘a class reduced to linear, sporadic, partial, local actions’ – as against an association of ideational 
paranoia with the bourgeoisie – ‘A class with radiant, irradiating ideas (but of course!).’ 
112 I want to be clear that it is in relation to this question of effective communist politics – and not abstract or 
social democratic critique of ‘violence’ or ‘extremism’ – that the problems of militancy are assessed in this paper. It 
hardly needs stating that given the mundane brutality of capitalism, let alone the war in Indochina, a critique of 
Weatherman at the level of its ‘violence’ per se would be ridiculous. 
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overhauling our brains. … Turn ourselves inside out and start all over again. … The 
process of criticism, self-criticism, transformation was the tool by which we would forge 
ourselves into new human beings. (Stern 1975: 94, 96) 
 
 
In accord with the impossible standard of militancy, even the most ferocious criticism 
could be justified as part of the process of self-transformation. Indeed, as is very clear from 
Stern’s account, a readiness both to enact brutal critique against another and to offer-up in 
cathartic confession one’s worst character traits were markers of revolutionary vitality, a 
preparedness to live the necessary betrayals of subjectivity and personal attachment that 
militancy required.113 Ayers (2001: 154) thus describes the process as a ‘purifying ceremony 
involving confession, sacrifice, rebirth, and gratitude’. The net effect of these sessions was of 
course that further commitment to struggle and investment in Weatherman was a means to 
absolve or defer the ever-returning failings of subjectivity that criticism/self-criticism revealed. 
This manner of constituting the collective body of the militant had a corresponding mode 
of sexuality, one characterised by an enforced anti-monogamy, the rotation of sexual partners, 
and group sex, apparently known as ‘wargasm’. Whilst anti-monogamy had an important role in 
feminist and countercultural critique of patriarchal relations and domestic structures, its 
expression in Weatherman’s militancy was such that its dominant function was to counteract 
the detrimental effects that monogamy could present to the intensification of collectivity.114 ‘If 
monogamy was smashed, so the theory went, everyone would love each other equally, and not 
love some people more than others. If everyone loved each other equally, then they could trust 
everyone more completely’ (Stern 1975: 114). Stern frames collectivity here in terms of ‘love’, but 
she is especially attentive to the way that monogamy was seen as an obstacle to the full pursuit 
of criticism/self-criticism – the principle constitutive field of Weatherman’s desire – such that 
the critique of monogamy was a common focus for these sessions; Stern (1975: 197) recounts an 
occasion where a monogamous couple were subject to two days of criticism after having been 
encouraged to ingest LSD. 
 
Other techniques for the self-constitution of militant investment in action included the 
‘gut check’, the practice of psyching-up oneself and others in a readiness to face or commit 
violence as an overcoming of perceived cowardice, racism, privilege, or lack of revolutionary 
commitment in the face of the continued oppression and death of US black peoples and the 
Vietnamese. It was in such moments of subjective ‘breakthrough’, experienced as an immanence 
with the foundational violence of capitalist society, that Weatherman found a kind of revelatory 
truth, one that marked the ‘exemplary’ position of the organisation in pushing beyond what they 
saw as the left’s fear-bound and half-hearted opposition that served to pre-empt its own defeat 
(Ono 1970: 254). Something of the orientation of the gut check – or its extreme variant, the 
‘death trip’ – is evident in Ono’s account of the Days of Rage: 
 
We frankly told people that, while a massacre was highly unlikely, we expected the 
actions to be very, very heavy, that hundreds of people might well be arrested and/or 
hurt, and, finally, that a few people might get killed. We argued that twenty white people 
                                                             
113 A year or two later, albeit in different circumstances, the United Red Army took self-criticism to its brutal 
extreme, killing ten of their number in its exercise (Igarashi 2007). 
114 It is clear that feminism had a complex and important presence in the organisation and that the 1970s 
guerrilla more widely had a strong feminist component – Alison Jamieson’s (2000) interviews with female members 
of the Red Brigades are fascinating on this point. My argument is that the militant diagram articulates feminist and 
other political and cultural elements in a manner that tends to further its own imperatives, albeit that these elements 
so articulated will also have progressive effects for women in militant groups and on the margins of core militant 
functions. 
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(one per cent of the projected minimum) getting killed while fighting hard against 
imperialist targets would not be a defeat, but a political victory… (Ono 1970: 251) 
 
Militancy also plays out through linguistic and symbolic form. As I noted above, for 
Guattari the signifying regime of Bolshevism is characterised by the transformation of the 
situated statements of central figures and organisational bodies into dogma and stereotypical 
formulae, whose repetition as refrains of the organisation function as dominant utterances to 
construct a field of authority and police divergence. It is a phenomena amply evident in Ayers 
(2001: 156) assessment: ‘We began to speak mostly in proverbs from Che or Ho. Soon all we 
heard in the collectives was an echo’. The reduction of political language to dogma is aided by, 
and contributes to, the relation that the militant diagram draws between theory and action. It is 
on this axis that the passional semiotic can take hold, a semiotic that is ‘active rather than 
ideational’, functioning ‘more as effort or action than imagination’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 
124, 120). Rather than see critical reflection and conceptual production as a constitutive part of 
practical engagement with the world, struggle tends to be presented in a dichotomous relation to 
thought, to ‘Mere words…mere ideas’ (Ono, cited in Varon 2004: 89). The possibility of struggle 
informed by and inflected through thought is thus passed by in favour of an affirmation of the 
importance of ‘doing something’. But once this division is established, language and theory (in 
the mode of dogma and cliché) can now flip over to the other side of the dichotomy to circulate 
in a reductive echolalia as so many postulates or ‘concise formula’ in the intensification of 
struggle (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 120). 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 127) are attentive here to the place of the word and a certain 
monotheism of the book – ‘the strangest cult’ – in the postsignifying regime of signs, as the book 
becomes the body of passion, extracted from its outside, elevated from critique, and entwined 
with subjective flight. This militant trait is most apparent in the Cultural Revolution, where 
‘Mao Zedong Thought’ – articulated as a cosmic truth and embodied most characteristically in 
the little red book of quotations – had a clear function as immortal substance, nourishment, and 
energiser of a passional struggle that was to transcend individual mortality. In the words of a 
1966 People’s Liberation Army newspaper, ‘The thought of Mao Tse-tung is the sun in our heart, 
is the root of our life, is the source of all our strength. Through this, man becomes unselfish, 
daring, intelligent, able to do everything; he is not conquered by any difficulty and can conquer 
every enemy’ (cited in Lifton 1970: 72) (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. ‘Chairman Mao is the Red Sun of Our Hearts’, 1966 poster. 
 
 
Weatherman was of course a rather different entity to the Cultural Revolution and 
constructed little of the latter’s highly complex vectoral semiotic components. Nonetheless, the 
organisation was keenly aware of the militant power of words, even if the language now seems 
only shrill and bombastic. Jeremy Varon (2004: 89) draws attention to this aspect of 
Weatherman, suggesting that ‘Its crude talk of vilifying “pig Amerika”, triumphant slogans, and 
speeches like those made at the Days of Rage all aimed at strengthening the resolve of its 
members to use militant action to accomplish what words alone could not’. Moreover, he argues 
that Weatherman text and image – in particular its aesthetic forms of collage and cartoon – 
worked to ‘de-realize’, and so accelerate, the group’s confrontation with the state. 
This mode of militant semiotics, then, is not confined to words, but subtends gesture, 
tone and image. As Guattari (1995: 58) argues, ‘It’s a whole axiomatics, down to the 
phonological level – the way of articulating certain words, the gesture that accompanies them’. 
It is thus possible to perceive the militant semiotic of Weatherman in operation not only within, 
for instance, Bernardine Dohrn’s infamous invocation of the Tate-LaBianca murders by the 
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Manson gang – ‘Dig it; first they killed those pigs, then they ate dinner in the room with them, 
then they shoved a fork into pig Tate’s stomach. Wild!’ (cited in Varon 2004: 160) – but also in 
the deployment of images of Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese flag,115 the posture held at 
the rostrum, the hard-hat worn at militant actions and disseminated as an iconic image of 
Weatherman’s extremism, even, if one allows for unintended co-production with the FBI, in the 
‘faciality’ – the field of facial screens and their passional black holes – of the widely distributed 
‘Wanted’ posters (see Deleuze and Guattari 1988: Ch 7) (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Quarter section of an FBI Weatherman poster 
 
 
It is on this plane of sign and image that the seductive aspect of a militant group like 
Weatherman is most manifest in wider environments. The composition and circulation of 
images, styles, sentiments, and gestures is certainly a key element in the affective texture of all 
political milieux. In this context, and drawing a relation to the US group that was most 
influential on Weatherman and its self-representation, Guattari’s (1996: 218-30) comments on 
Genet’s account in Prisoner of Love of the ‘image function’ of the Black Panther Party are 
instructive. In Guattari’s reading, the style and comportment of the Panthers created a rich 
enunciative texture and psychic formation that had especial generative power for black 
communities in politicising cultural and phenotypical traits, and in developing an experimental 
image and practice – myths as ‘collective operators’ – of black resistance and cultural expression, 
whilst simultaneously haunting and disquieting majority Whiteness (Figure 3). Though of 
considerably less significance than the BPP and working with a different repertoire of styles and 
                                                             
115 I hasten to add, it is not the Vietcong images themselves that is at issue here, but their function in the 
militant signifying regime. 
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stratifications, the image function of Weatherman (the ‘Weather-myth’ as it was known) also 
worked to compose an imaginary and affective field of resistance to US imperialism – and one 
patterned and inflected by a wider pop- and counter-cultural set of forms and vocabularies – 
that could have been constitutive of progressive political effects beyond those determined by 
Weatherman’s particular practice. 
 
 
Figure 3. Kathleen Cleaver and other Black Panthers in the office of the Prosecution against 
Huey P. Newton, 1968 © Bancroft Library, University of California. 
 
In raising this possibility, however, it is important to be attentive to the way such images 
can produce a spectacle of revolution that is easily commodified by – or co-produced with – 
news media and culture industries and consumed in the politically unproductive manner of an 
imaginary identification with an icon of resistance. This would seem to have been a prominent 
feature of the cultural appreciation of the 1970s guerrilla, whether as an alienable unit of 
consumer style in the ‘Prada-Meinhof’ mode or, as Bruce LaBruce irreverently dramatises in the 
queer porn film The Raspberry Reich, a repertoire of radical postures (Figure 4). Whilst it is 
possible to unsettle or exceed spectacular forms of circulation and consumption – media 
modulation is certainly more complex than a simple game of resistance and recuperation – one 
still needs to be careful that the affective charge that may emerge from engagement with these 
images does not reproduce the militant moods and functions latent in them; even in the 
existential richness and political intensity of the Panthers’ iconography was interwoven a rather 
suspect militarised and patriarchal image of militancy (Carr 1975; Doss 2001). 
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Figure 4. Promotional still from The Raspberry Reich, 
http://www.theraspberryreich.com/rasp.html 
 
 
It is a central paradox of militancy that as an organisation constitutes itself as a unified 
body it tends to become closed to the outside, to the non-militant, those who would be the basis 
of any mass movement. Indeed, to the degree that the militant body conceives of itself as having 
discovered the correct revolutionary principle and establishes its centre of activity on adherence 
to this principle, it has a tendency to develop hostility to those who fall short of its standard. 
Weatherman resolved this paradox by investing revolutionary agency in the anti-imperialist 
struggles of the global South, most prominently that of the Vietcong, and the movements of 
black revolutionary struggle in ‘the internal colony’, especially the Black Panther Party. In this 
arena of agency, the substitution of Weatherman’s own exemplary action for a domestic white 
working class movement freed it up to exist in splendid isolation and in contempt for the mass 
of white America (Varon 2004: 93, 166). 
Ultimately cut-off from the possibility of engaging with wider social strata by these 
techniques, Weatherman was driven into the logical extension of an intensified militancy closed 
in upon itself and developed ‘the politics of full alienation’ (as one member put it to Stern, in the 
affirmative) in the movement to a clandestine, underground organisation: ‘Going underground 
was not just a wild gambit for me. It was all that was left before death’ (Stern 1975: 240). Ayers 
characterises the build up to this phase of the organisation in a fashion that foregrounds the 
self-devouring tendencies of militant passion (no doubt with a retrospective awareness of the 
impending New York townhouse bombing116 that was to act as something of a break in 
                                                             
116 Three members of Weatherman were killed in March 1970 when bombs they were preparing accidentally 
detonated, completely destroying a town house in Greenwich Village. These were the only deaths caused by 
Weatherman, though the devices being constructed included nail bombs intended for a noncommissioned officers’ 
dance. A compelling first hand account of the explosion can be found in Wilkerson (2007: 336-348). 
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Weatherman’s militant line of flight): 
 
It was fanatical obedience, we militant nonconformists suddenly tripping over one 
another to be exactly alike, following the sticky rules of congealed idealism. I cannot 
reproduce the stifling atmosphere that overpowered us. Events came together with the 
gentleness of an impending train wreck, and there was the sad sensation of waiting for 
impact. (Ayers 2001: 154) 
 
 
Contours of an a-Militant Diagram 
In order to approach the possibility of a political practice beyond militancy I want in the 
remainder of this paper to consider some initial contours of an a-militant diagram, or dispersive 
ecology of composition. I will confine the discussion to the relation between the political group 
and that which lies outside it, what might be known by militant assemblages as ‘the masses’ – as 
Guattari (1984: 190) implies, it is on this axis that the question of an ‘other machine’ beyond 
that of the militant should be posed. It is instructive to address the question through Marx’s 
problematic of the party. 
Given the dominant twentieth century image of political Marxism, The Manifesto of the 
Communist Party has very little to do with the kind of party one might expect. It sets up a 
‘Manifesto of the party itself’ to counter the bourgeois ‘nursery tale of the Spectre of 
Communism’, but the party it announces is something quite different to a distinct (or timeless) 
organizational entity: 
 
The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties. 
 
They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole. 
 
They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould 
the proletarian movement. 
 
The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 
 
1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out 
and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all 
nationality. 
 
2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against 
the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests 
of the movement as a whole. (Marx and Engels 1973: 79, 98) 
 
If not an organizational form, the party instead suggests a diagram of composition, a 
virtual set of parameters and orientations, and one that is immanent to ‘the proletariat as a 
whole’. Though the party seeks to forward certain modes of thought and community – notably, 
internationalism and the critique of capital – Marx is at pains to stress that it is not a 
concentrative articulation, but a dispersive one. The party is stretched across the social field, 
dependent upon social forces and struggles for its existence or its substance, and, in an 
anticipatory and precarious fashion, oriented toward social contingencies and events. As Alain 
Badiou (2005: 74, 75) argues – if to use his work in this context is not to deform it too far – not 
only is it the case that ‘For the Marx of 1848, that which is named “party” has no form of bond 
even in the institutional sense’, but ‘the real characteristic of the party is not its firmness, but its 
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porosity to the event, its dispersive flexibility in the face of unforeseeable circumstances’. To this 
should be added that inasmuch as the party is immanent to the manifold arrangements of 
capitalist social production, a production that is fully machinic (‘this automaton consisting of 
numerous mechanical and intellectual organs’), it poses a terrain of alliance and event that 
exceeds an abstract humanity (Marx 1973: 692). 
Given the precarious and anticipatory orientation of the party there is considerable 
insight in Jacques Rancière’s (2003: 86) argument that Marx’s party – for all its universality – is 
directed not toward unity but division, that ‘first of all the purpose of a party is not to unite but 
divide’. In Rancière’s reading of Marx this division names the communist disruption of the 
modes of identity and security associated with the workers’ movement; one could say that it is 
the effect of the proletariat as its own overcoming on the workers’ movement as identity.117 Yet 
Rancière reduces this process of disruption to a mechanism of interminable deferral on Marx’s 
part, a mechanism that induces Marx’s dissolution of the Communist League and thereafter sets 
up the science of capital, and the writing of its book, as the proxy of the proletariat forever 
postponed. In making ‘division’ function in Marx as a self-separation from politics, Rancière 
both elides the fundamental innovation of Marx’s dispersive understanding of the party and 
ignores the dynamic and intensive facets of its division in the practical critique of authoritarian 
and anti-proletarian organizational practice – vis-à-vis, for instance, the persistence of 
Freemasonry and the secret society in the workers’ movement, Jacobin models of dictatorship 
by enlightened minority, utopian efforts to bypass the working class, Bakuninist ‘invisible 
dictatorship’, and so on. 
Jacques Camatte and Gianni Collu’s (1995: 19-38) 1969 open letter ‘On Organization’ 
(which marked the withdrawal of the group around the journal Invariance from the post-’68 
groupuscule milieu, and their dissolution as an organised body) approaches Marx’s dispersive 
party in a more productive fashion than Rancière. In the left communist tradition with which 
Camatte is associated, the variable nature of struggle over time and the complexity of forces and 
problems that make up any historical conjuncture are such that there is no necessary continuity 
of a ‘formal’ party.118 Indeed, in times when agitation is on the wane, attempts to constitute 
revolutionary organizations become counterproductive, not least because they substitute 
organizational coherence and continuity for diffuse social struggle as the object of communist 
politics (this, as part of maintaining global conditions conducive to the survival of the Soviet 
economy, having been a key effect of the Communist Party on the international stage). As such, 
in François Martin’s assessment, ‘The dissolution of the organizational forms which are created 
by the movement, and which disappear when the movement ends, does not reflect the weakness 
of the movement, but rather its strength’ (in Dauvé and Martin n.d.: 57). 
Camatte and Collu extend this position to argue that all radical organizations tend 
toward a counter-revolutionary, ‘racket’ form, functioning as anti-inventive points of attraction 
and solidification in social environments. In a critique that bears comparison with Guattari’s 
account of Bolshevism, Camatte and Collu argue that the radical group is the political correlate 
of the modern business organization, orchestrating patterns of identity and investment 
appropriate to a capitalism that – in what is an early use of the concept of ‘real subsumption’ – 
has disarticulated sociality from traditional forms of community and identity and incorporated 
the workers’ movement in its own dynamic. Operating through a foundational and ever-renewed 
demarcation between interior and exterior, the group coheres through the attraction points of 
theoretical or activist standpoint and key members (themselves constituted as such through 
                                                             
117 I consider this self-overcoming in more depth in Thoburn (2003), through the figure of the ‘proletarian 
unnameable’. 
118 See Marx (n.d.), where, against the accusation of ‘inactivity’ and ‘doctrinaire indifference’, he positively 
evaluates his non-involvement in political associations in the period after the collapse of the Communist League; and 
Camatte (1977). 
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intellectual sophistication, militant commitment, or charismatic personality) and the motive 
forces of membership prestige, competition for recognition, and fear of exclusion. The effect is 
to reproduce in militants the psychological dependencies, hierarchies, and competitive traits of 
the wider society, constitute an homogeneous formation based on the equivalence of its 
members to the particular element that defines it, and mark a delimiting separation from – and, 
ultimately, a hostility to – the open manifold of social relations and struggles, precisely that 
which should be the milieu of inventive communist politics. Importantly, the problem is not at 
all one of the relative formality of the group; these tendencies may well be found at the extreme 
in ‘unstructured’ aggregations or ‘disorganisations’, where informal inter-subjective relations 
take primacy (see Freeman n.d.; Andrew X 1999; King 2004). 
Some of these aspects of militant group-formation have been seen above in Weatherman, 
but the pertinent point here is the way Camatte and Collu seek to develop a way out from the 
organisation. In opposition to the centripetal dynamics of the group-form and its militant 
subjective correlate, Camatte and Collu assert that communist practice is necessarily 
characterized by a refusal of all group activity, a kind of warding-off of the dominant social 
tendency toward group formation. This critique of the group is not followed with an assertion of 
individual subjectivity – a locus of composition no less able to accrue prestige and authority in 
opposition to dispersive social struggle. Indeed, the critique of the group has a corresponding 
subjective unworking in the ‘revolutionary anonymity’ that Camatte and Collu borrow from 
Amadeo Bordiga, as signaled by their text’s epigraph from Marx: ‘Both of us scoff at being 
popular. Among other things our disgust at any personality cult is evidence of this . . . When 
Engels and I first joined the secret society of communists, we did it on the condition sine qua 
non that they repeal all statutes that would be favorable to a cult of authority’ (cited in Camatte 
and Collu 1995: 20). In place of the group and the individual, the basis of composition instead 
becomes an immanence with social forces: ‘The revolutionary must not identify himself [sic] 
with a group but recognize himself in a theory that does not depend on a group or on a review, 
because it is the expression of an existing class struggle’ (Camatte and Collu 1995: 32-3). 
Camatte and Collu’s anti-voluntarist subtraction of agency from communist minorities is 
an intriguing and important articulation of Marx’s dispersive and disruptive party. But as it 
plays out in line with a common dilemma for left communist groupings – whose opposition to 
the Leninist party can result in a reluctance to engage in any form of intervention for fear of 
directly or indirectly introducing anti-inventive dynamics and leadership models into 
proletarian formations (see Dauvé and Martin n.d.: 63-76) – it offers only a partial solution to 
the problem of militancy. Outside a period of agitation Camatte and Collu leave communist 
minorities in a rather anaemic position without a positive conception of the field of political 
composition, other than the development of theory and the maintenance of a small network of 
informal relations between those engaged in similar work. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to the question of the group and its outside shares 
much with that of Camatte and Collu, not least in their own ‘involuntarism’ – a crucial 
mechanism in opening a breach with received political practice, identity and authority, and 
orienting toward the event (Valentin 2006; Buchanan and Thoburn 2008). But out of this 
shared problematic emerges a more productive sense of the terrain of a-militant composition. In 
his preface to Anti-Oedipus Foucault rightly draws attention to the way the book invited a 
practical critique of militant organisations and subjectivities: 
 
I would say that Anti-Oedipus (may its authors forgive me) is a book of ethics, the first 
book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time (perhaps that explains why its 
success was not limited to a particular ‘readership’: being anti-oedipal has become a life 
style, a way of thinking and living). How does one keep from being fascist, even 
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(especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant? (Foucault, in 
Deleuze and Guattari 1983: xii) 
 
Unlike Camatte and Collu, however, this practical critique of militancy is characterised 
not by a withdrawal from groups as such. It initially takes the form of an analytic of groups and a 
certain affirmation of the ‘subject group’ as a mode of political composition oriented toward 
innovative collective composition and enunciation, and open to its outside and the possibility of 
its own death – in contrast to the ‘subjugated group’, cut off from the world and fixated on its 
own self-preservation (Deleuze 2004: 193-203). Yet this formulation, useful though it is in the 
analysis of group dynamics, is perhaps still too caught-up with activist patterns of collectivity 
and voluntarism. As Deleuze and Guattari’s project unfolds, the model of the subject group thus 
loses prominence in favour of an opening of perception to, and critical engagement with, the 
multiplicity of groups – or, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, assemblages or arrangements – 
which compose any situation, following their notion that ‘we are all groupuscules’. Guattari thus 
states in a 1980 interview: 
 
At one time I came up with the idea of the ‘subject-group’. I contrasted these with 
‘subjected groups’ in an attempt to define modes of intervention which I described as 
micro-political. I’ve changed my mind: there are no subject-groups, but arrangements of 
enunciation, of subjectivization, pragmatic arrangements which do not coincide with 
circumscribed groups. These arrangements can involve individuals but also ways of 
seeing the world, emotional systems, conceptual machines, memory devices, economic, 
social components, elements of all kinds. (Guattari 1996b: 227-8) 
 
In this conception there is a clear disarticulation of political practice from the 
construction of coherent collective subjectivity, or a strong critique of groups, but in a fashion 
that bypasses the anti-group position with an orientation toward the discontinuous and 
multi-layered arrangements that traverse and compose social – or, indeed, planetary – life. 
Crucially, the associated political articulations – ‘cartographies’ or ‘ecologies’ in Guattari’s later 
writings – are machinic in nature. They include, and may be instigated by, material and 
immaterial objects – technological apparatus, medias, city-environments, images, economic 
instruments, sonorous fields, landscapes, aesthetic artefacts – as much as human bodies, 
subjective dispositions and cognitive and affective refrains. As such, they are open to political 
analysis, intervention and modulation through tactical, sensual, linguistic, technical, 
organisational, architectural, and conceptual repertoires. It would certainly be a mistake to see 
this ecological orientation as a retreat from a passional practice – if Anti-Oedipus suggests an 
antifascist ethics, A Thousand Plateaus is precisely concerned with the exploration of modes 
and techniques of passional composition, often of a most experimental and liminal kind. This is 
a passion, however, that arises not in a subjective monomania carved off from its outside, but in 
situated problematics that are characterised by a deferral of subjective interiority and a 
dispersive opening to the social multiplicity and its virtual potential. This is how one can 
understand Deleuze and Guattari’s affirmation of ‘becoming imperceptible’ – of drawing the 
world on oneself and oneself on the world – as a political figure; it is not a sublime end-point of 
spiritual inaction, but the immanent kernel of a-militant political composition.119 
 
The visual image of the heroic militant is, I have suggested, a key component of the 
modern militant diagram. To draw this paper to a close with some indications of a different 
practice, it is important to note that aspects of the ecological or cartographic approach can also 
                                                             
119 I have approached some of the many subsequent questions about the nature of such composition – not 
least with regard to the place of capital – through the figure of ‘minor politics’ in Thoburn (2003a and 2003b). 
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be seen in the aesthetic expressions of political bodies; from the anecdote that the orientations 
of Italian Operaismo were such that the bedroom walls of activists saw the substitution of 
diagrammatic maps of the FIAT Mirafiori plant for the iconic images of Mao and Che Guevara 
(Moulier 1989: 13), to Bureau d’Études (2004) who – mindful of the dangers of the conventional 
signs of militant aggregation such as the flag and the raised fist, symmetrical with the images of 
national sovereignty as they can be – have developed a political and pedagogical ecology routed 
through the aesthetic and cognitive object of the map (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Bureau d’Études ‘Infowar/psychic war’, utangente.free.fr 
 
The exploration of some of these themes can also be seen in contemporary 
problematisation of activist practice. A most striking instance is the Argentinian grouping 
Colectivo Situaciones (2005) whose figure of ‘militant research’ evokes a knowledge/practice 
that works without subject or object through an immanent appreciation of encounters, problems 
and situations, and in a fashion that is particularly attentive to the dangers of transcendent 
models of political subjectivity and modes of communication. The problematic of a dispersive 
political practice is raised too in the Luther Blissett and Wu Ming projects, concerned as these 
experiments in the ‘multiple name’ have been with a disarticulation of modes of seduction, style, 
and mythopoesis from the author-function and its associated regimes of property and authority 
– something of a left communist erasure of militant faciality (Figure 6). But these formations 
lead to questions of composition that are best approached through an appreciation of their 
particularity and that move beyond the specific focus of this paper, the critique of the militant. 
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Figure 6. Wu Ming ‘This Revolution is Faceless’, www.wumingfoundation.com 
 
 
Conclusion 
One can discern in Deleuze and Guattari’s work an identification of, and a response to, 
the problem of militant subjectivity. This response posits a deterritorialisation of the self that 
develops not from a concentration in militant passion (as one finds in Weatherman) or a 
surrender to revolutionary inaction (the danger that haunts Camatte’s critique of organisation) 
but from the condition of being stretched across the social in a diffusion and critical involution 
in the technical, aesthetic, semiotic, economic, affective relations of the world. In resonance with 
Marx’s understanding of the party, this suggests not a serene unanimity but a complex, intensive, 
and open plane of composition. The party here is a field of intervention in social relations that 
undoes identity, not an identity carved off from social relations. 
This is not, of course, an actualised politics or programme; it is better seen as the first 
principle of an a-militant, communist diagram. The interventions, aggregations, functions and 
expressions that animate and enrich this diagram may well configure environments of a directly 
insurrectionary nature, but they would be so as the collective and manifold problematisation of 
social relations and events, not as the invention of militant organisations acting like ‘alchemists 
of the revolution’ (Marx and Engels 1978: 318). For it is in the multiple and diffuse social 
arrangements and lines of flight that political change emerges and with which political 
formations – in their ‘dispersive flexibility’ – need to maintain an intimate and subtle relation if 
they are not to fall into the calcified self-assurance of militant subjectivity. Deleuze’s warning 
about the danger of marginality has pertinence here too: 
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It is not the marginals who create the lines; they install themselves on these lines and 
make them their property, and this is fine when they have that strange modesty of men 
[sic] of the line, the prudence of the experimenter, but it is a disaster when they slip into 
the black hole from which they no longer utter anything but the micro-fascist speech of 
their dependency and their giddiness: ‘We are the avant-garde’, ‘We are the marginals.’ 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 139) 
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Comment on Nicholas Thoburn 
Kosuke Oki 
 
 
1. Condition of the possibility of a-militant diagram 
 
You criticize the militant subjectivity and explore the possibility of “a-militant political 
composition”. You also point out that “a-militant composition” needs its dispersive flexibility 
and its multiplicity. I would agree with this conclusion, but the question is how that is possible. 
I would cite two approaches to answer this question. One is Laclau and Mouffe’s 
approach. Based on what they call the logic of equivalence, differences can be articulated by an 
equivalence. This equivalence is constructed through antagonisms. Laclau and Mouffe argue 
that the equivalence which articulates differences is not positive but negative, or empty. This 
negativity functions as a signifier, which is supposed to fix floating signifiers, that is, the empty 
signifier. 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
 
 
 
                         Laclau and Mouffe’s logic of equivalence 
 
I think it is dubious that the empty signifier can articulate differences. Because Laclau 
and Mouffe’s logic of equivalence is very similar to Marx’s total or expanded form of value (form 
B). According to Marx, since the total or expanded form of value has defects, the transition from 
this form to the general form of value is inevitable. Likewise, in the logic of equivalence, it is 
impossible for the empty signifier to function as an anchor and therefore the empty site may 
well be occupied by one of particularities (the general equivalent), otherwise the chain of the 
equivalence will be disarticulated. 
It is the other approach to attempt to acrobatically avoid this difficulty, namely Hardt 
and Negri’s approach. They substitute Empire for the empty signifier. The reason why Empire 
makes it possible for their multitude to cooperate is that there is no outside to Empire. If Empire 
includes all of the multitude, every struggle must be against Empire, or a counter-Empire. This 
Empire-multitude pyramid is different from Laclau and Mouffe’s logic of equivalence in two 
ways. Firstly, the pyramid is not incomplete like the chain of equivalence but closed. Secondly, 
the nodal point of articulation is not empty but filled. In this pyramid, the position of Empire 
corresponds to that of money in Marx’s money form (form D). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Hardt and Negri’s Empire-multitude pyramid 
the empty signifier 
 
A    B    C    D   E     ….… 
(counter-)Empire 
 
A    B     C    D   ..…..   Z 
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I think that there is a crucial problem with this approach. Hardt and Negri’s scheme depends on 
the premise that there is no outside to Empire. However I think that their premise is doubtful. 
On this premise, even if there is the outside to Empire, the outside must be made invisible. As a 
result, Hardt and Negri’s approach leads to the separation between the visible multitude and the 
invisible multitude, the multitude inside to Empire and the multitude outside to Empire. 
 
2. Location of the ‘economy’ in politics 
 
Marxian economists often think that capital labor-power relation is a kernel of capitalist 
economy. As you know, the Marxian concept of labor-power has been criticized for its 
narrowness. Although I acknowledge that there are some problems with the traditional concept 
of labor-power, it seems to me that capital labor-power relation remains to be the key to analyze 
capitalism. In my opinion, capital labor-power relation is not one of various social relations and 
all of the multitude does not have direct relation with capital. Capital makes the most 
fundamental separation which precedes the other social relations and relate only to one side 
separated from the other side. 
Capital is autonomous by nature and independent from the outside. It is the only way 
for capital to relate to and internalize the outside that labor-power is commodified. However, 
capital does not internalize everything. Everyone does not become a worker and workers 
themselves are not commodified. It is labor-power which is commodified. Capital makes the 
distinction between those are commodified and those are not commodified. Capital creates the 
outside to itself, and, as Deleuze and Guattari pointed out, capitalism retteritorializes what is 
deterritorialized. 
The point of this commodifying coincides with what Althusser calls the point of 
subjectification through interpellation. While labor-power is commodified, the subject is 
constituted as the proprietor of labor-power, or the proletarian. Futhermore, commodification 
of labor-power is concerning with Deleuze and Guattari’s passional, postsigfying subjective 
regime. In fact, they indicated as follows. “… [C]apital acts as the point of sujectification that 
constitutes all human being as subjects; but some, the “capitalists,” are subjects of enunciation 
that form the private subjectivity of capital, while the others, the “proletarians,” are subjects of 
the statement, subjected to the technical machines in which constant capital is effectuated”(TP, 
p.457). 
Needless to say, commodification of labor-power is not the only point of 
subjectification. The point of subjectification can be anything. Therefore, diverse subjects can be 
emerged in capitalism. Nevertheless, I’d like to stress that the point of sujectification that 
constitutes capitalists and proletarians is most fundamental. Certainly, capital cannot determine 
every subject. However, the demarcation between the inside and the outside by capital precedes 
diverse subjectification, for it is the outside to capital, or the line of flight, where other subjects, 
including militant subjectivity, can be constituted.
